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Abstract We investigate the composable security of unidimensional contin-
uous variable quantum key distribution (UCVQKD), which is based on the
Gaussian modulation of a single quadrature of the coherent-state of light,
aiming to provide a simple implementation of key distribution compared to
the symmetrically modulated Gaussian coherent-state protocols. This protocol
neglects the necessity in one of the quadrature modulation in coherent-states
and hence reduces the system complexity. To clarify the influence of finite-size
effect and the cost of performance degeneration, we establish the relation-
ship of the balanced parameters of the unmodulated quadrature and estimate
the precise secure region. Subsequently, we illustrate the composable security
of the UCVQKD protocol against collective attacks and achieve the tightest
bound of the UCVQKD protocol. Numerical simulations show the asymptotic
secret key rate of the UCVQKD protocol, together with the symmetrically
modulated Gaussian coherent-state protocols.
Keywords Quantum key distribution · Unidimensional modulation ·
Composable security
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2,3] is a branch of quantum cryptogra-
phy, whose goal is to provide an elegant way that allows two distant legitimate
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partners, Alice and Bob, to share a random secure key over unsecure quan-
tum and classical channels. Its security is provided by the laws of quantum
physics [4,5]. QKD has spurred lots of interest over the last three decades,
giving birth to two main approaches, i.e., discrete-variable (DV) QKD [6,7,8]
and continuous-variable (CV) QKD [9,10,11,12,13,14]. In the first approach,
the key bits are usually encoded to the polarization status of single photons.
Different from the former approach, in CVQKD, the sender Alice usually en-
codes key bits in the quadratures (xˆ and pˆ) of optical field with Gaussian
modulation [15], while the receiver Bob can restore the secret key bits through
homodyne or heterodyne detection techniques [16,17].
In the traditional CVQKD protocol, there are usually the amplitude and
phase quadratures used for the symmetrical modulations. However, in an
asymmetric CVQKD protocol, there is only one quadrature for information
modulation (e.g., an amplitude modulator or a phase modulator), which is
called the UCVQKD[18,19], was suggested to reduce the complexity and the
cost of apparatus, facilitating the commercialization of the practical CVQKD.
Moreover, in the UCVQKD protocol it could avoid creating a hole in the cen-
ter of Gaussian probability distribution by adopting a simple single-quadrature
modulation [18] and allows the implementation using more standard and cheaper
devices. However, it was still challenged by the degree of performance degen-
eration and the influence of finite-size effect of the UCVQKD, due to the
ambiguous relationship of the parameters related to the unmodulated quadra-
tures.
As for the security CVQKD protocols, it can usually be analyzed in the
asymptotic case, the finite-size regime and the composable security. In the
asymptotic case, the asymptotic secure key rate can be achieved with the co-
variance matrix of whole quantum system. However, the asymptotic secure
key rate is a theoretically computed value which ignores the finite size effect
of raw keys, and its upper bound cannot be achieved in practice. In order
to solve this problem, a security analysis which takes the finite-size effects
into account was proposed [20]. As a result, the secure key rates are more
pessimistic than those obtained in asymptotic case, but it is more closer to
the practice. After that, the composable security for symmetrically modulated
Gaussian coherent-state protocols [21,22,23] was proposed to provide several
refined security proofs and improved bounds for the secret key rates. Lever-
rier [24] suggested the composable security proof for CVQKD with coherent
states against collective attacks and confirmed that the Gaussian attacks are
optimal asymptotically in the case of composable security framework. It is the
enhancement of security based on uncertainty of the finite-size effect [25], and
thus, one can achieve the best security, namely the tightest bound, by subtly
dividing the failure probabilities in the CVQKD system.
In this paper, we give an overall security analysis of the UCVQKD pro-
tocol, which is based on the Gaussian modulation of a single quadrature of
the coherent-state of light, in both asymptotic case and finite-size regime. We
derive the relationship of the parameters related to the unmodulated quadra-
ture in the suitable secure regions with two extreme scenarios, which show the
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Fig. 1 Scheme of the UCVQKD protocol. (Top) Prepare-and-measure model. Alice pre-
pares a coherent state using a laser source and then displaces the state along the modulated
quadrature by using modulator M, VM is the modulation variance. The states are subse-
quently sent to Bob through a general phase-sensitive channel with transmittance ηx,p and
excess noise εx,p. (Bottom) Equivalent entanglement-based model using two-mode squeezed
vacuum state (EPR state), Alice measures mode A using homodyne detection which projects
the other half of EPR state onto a squeezed state B, then a squeezing operation is applied
to transform mode B to a coherent state B1. Subsequently mode B1 is sent to Bob through
the generally phase-sensitive channel controlled by Eve.
oretical performance of asymptotic secret key rate of the UCVQKD protocol.
To render the performance close to the reality, we analyze the composable
security of the UCVQKD protocol against collective attacks, and obtain the
tightest bound of the UCVQKD protocol.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we demonstrate the structure
of the UCVQKD protocol. In Sec. III, we establish the relationship of the pa-
rameters related to the unmodulated quadrature, and derive the symptomatic
secret key of the UCVQKD protocol. In Sec. IV, we illustrate the composable
security of the UCVQKD protocol. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. V.
2 Scheme design of the UCVQKD
The data process of the UCVQKD focuses on using only one quadrature of
coherent states to modulate information. This is in stark contrast to previ-
ous protocols where two quadratures are modulated simultaneously. As can
be seen from the top panel of FIG. 1, it illustrates the prepare-and-measure
UCVQKD protocol. The trusted sender, Alice, prepares coherent states with
laser source, where one of the quadratures xˆ (amplitude quadrature) or pˆ
(phase quadrature) is modulated using modulator M . As a result, each coher-
ent state is displaced with displacement variance VM according to a random
4 Qin Liao1 et al.
number drawn from a one-dimensional Gaussian alphabet. Without loss of
generality, we assume xˆ is modulated for rendering the simple derivation. The
prepared states are subsequently sent to the remote trusted party Bob through
a generally phase-sensitive channel with transmittance ηx, ηp and excess noise
εx, εp in xˆ and pˆ quadratures, respectively [18]. Bob applies either heterodyne
or homodyne detector to perform coherent detection of the quadratures. Note
that although pˆ quadrature is not modulated, Bob still needs to measure it
(measuring most of the time xˆ quadrature and sometimes pˆ quadrature) to
gather statistics on the properties of the channel in pˆ quadrature [19]. The
data acquired by Bob while measuring the amplitude quadrature xˆ is corre-
lated with Alice’s modulated data. After several runs, this correlation can be
used to extract a secret key by post-processing. The most advantage of the
UCVQKD protocol is that the protocol would well simplify the implementation
with more standard and cheaper devices, and hence reduces the complexity of
CVQKD system.
3 Asymptotic security of the UCVQKD
To simplify the security analysis, we switch to the equivalent entanglement-
based (EB) scheme, which allows the explicit description of the trusted modes
and correlations, as shown at the bottom panel of FIG. 1 where quantum
channel is replaced by eavesdropper Eve and the so called entangling cloner
[15,26,27] can be used for launching the proven optimal collective Gaussian
attack. Eve could replace quantum channel with transmittance ηx,p and ex-
cess noise referred to the input χx,p by preparing the ancilla |E〉 of variance
Wx,p and a beam splitter of transmittance ηx,p. The value Wx,p can be tuned
to match the noise of the real channel χx,p = (1 − ηx,p)/ηx,p + εx,p. In order
to simplify the description, we only focus on the UCVQKD with reverse rec-
onciliation (RR), while the direct reconciliation (DR) version can be derived
through interchanging the sides of Alice and Bob.
According to the extremity of Gaussian quantum states [15,28,29], the
lower bound of the asymptotic secret key rate of the UCVQKD protocol under
collective attack strategy can be given by
K = βI(A : B2)− χE , (1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A : B2) is the Shannon mutual
information on quadrature xˆ available to the trusted parties Alice and Bob,
and Eve’s information χE = S(E)− S(E|xB) is the Holevo bound [30] of the
upper mutual information extractable from Eve and Bob for RR. After Bob
applies homodyne measurement, Eve purifies the whole system, rendering the
mutual information between Eve and Bob measurement expressed as
χE = S(E)− S(E|xB)
= S(AB2)− S(A|xB).
(2)
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Therefore, the asymptotic secret key rate of the UCVQKD protocol for RR is
derived as
KRR = βI(A : B2)− (S(AB2)− S(A|xB)). (3)
As mentioned in the UCVQKD protocol, it uses only one quadrature (says
xˆ) to modulate information, which results in its covariance matrix no longer
symmetric in both quadratures as its counterpart, the symmetrical Gaussian
modulation coherent-state QKD protocol (i.e. GG02 protocol [17]). In EB
UCVQKD scheme, Alice prepares two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) states
|Ψ〉 of variance V and each TMSV state involves two modes A and B, which
can be expressed by
|Ψ〉 =
√
1− z2
∞∑
i=0
zi|iA〉 ⊗ |iB〉, (4)
where z ∈ [0, 1) and |i〉i∈N denotes the Fock state. Alice keeps mode A of TMSV
state to herself and sends mode B to Bob. For the UCVQKD protocol, such
a scheme can be realized by performing a local squeezing operation S with
a squeezing parameter − log√V onto mode B before it is sent to quantum
channel, which results in the following covariance matrix:
ΓAB1 =

V 0
√
V (V 2−1) 0
0 V 0 −
√
V 2−1
V√
V (V 2−1) 0 V 2 0
0 −
√
V 2−1
V 0 1
 . (5)
Thus, the EB scheme is then equivalent to the Gaussian displacement of co-
herent states along the xˆ quadrature with variance VM = V
2−1. As the states
travel through quantum channel with transmittance ηx,p and excess noise εx,p,
the transformed covariance matrix is formed as follow:
ΓAB2 =
(
γA σAB2
σAB2 γB2
)
, (6)
where γA =
√
VM + 1I, I represent diag(1,1), and
γB2 =
(
1 + ηx(VM + εx) 0
0 1 + ηpεp
)
, (7)
and
σAB2 =
(
(ηxVM
√
VM + 1)
1
2 0
0 (
ηpVM√
VM+1
)
1
2
)
σz, (8)
where
σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (9)
It is worth noting that, since there is no modulation in pˆ quadrature at Alice’
side, the channel transmittance and excess noise thereby cannot be estimated
in pˆ quadrature for the parameter estimation. Therefore, Bob cannot obtain
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Fig. 2 Regions bounded by physicality and the positive secret key rate with the varied
parameters ηp and εp. Colored bar at the right side represents the positive secret key rate.
Modulation variance is VM = 100, channel transmittance is ηx = 0.4, and excess noise in
quadrature xˆ is εx = 0.05 respectively.
the estimated values of ηp and εp, respectively. In fact, since Bob needs to
measure pˆ quadrature, he can acquire the result of the variance of the channel
output in pˆ quadrature rather than the parameter ηp and εp. That is to say,
the item noted as 1 + ηpεp in matrix γB2 is known. However, Bob cannot
acquire the correlation between the two trusted modes in pˆ quadrature due to
ηp and εp are unknowable. In order to estimate the asymptotic key rate of the
UCVQKD protocol, we have to derive the relationship of the two unknown
parameters ηp and εp.
Theoretically, the two parameters can be set to any values limited in their
domain. However, according to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [31], the
unknown parameters must be bounded by the requirement of physicality,
which satisfies the following constraint
ΓAB2 + iΩ > 0, (10)
where Ω is the symplectic form with
Ω =
n⊕
i=1
ω, ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (11)
For the UCVQKD protocol, the two unknown parameters satisfy the physical
constraint
(κ
√
ηx −√ηp)2 6 (1− κηx)(1 + ηpεp − κ), (12)
where κ = 11+ηxεx .
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the regions bounded by physicality and the positive
secret key rate with the given parameters ηx = 0.4 and εx = 0.05 (these
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value could represent one of the usual cases). The whole plane is divided into
three regions, i.e., unphysical region, unsecure region, and secure region. In
unphysical region, it denotes the restricted zone in which the current values
of ηp and εp cannot be set simultaneously, otherwise it will violate Heisenberg
uncertainty principle. That is to say, even though the maximum secret key rate
(point (1)) existing in this area, it is impractical to achieve such highest secret
key rate in reality. In unsecure region, it shows (the blank area within the
unphysical region excluded) that the UCVQKD protocol cannot generate the
positive secret key rate. In secure region, it shows the UCVQKD protocol with
suitable parameters ηp and εp can generate the positive secret key rate under
the optimal collective attack. Therefore, the accessible maximum asymptotic
secret key rate can be achieved at the point (2) instead of the unrealistic point
(1). Moreover, in order to ensure the security, one should further take the more
pessimistic case into account. The pessimistic case and the optimal case can
be derived as the two extreme scenarios in Appendix B.
In what follows, we show the asymptotic performance of the UCVQKD
protocol. In the traditional communication system, one expects the values
of channel loss and excess noise in both quadratures are symmetric, namely
ηp = ηx = η and εp = εx = ε. Therefore, the previous covariance matrix ΓAB2
turns to:
Γ symAB2 =
(
γA σABsym2
σABsym2 γB
sym
2
)
, (13)
where
γsymB2 =
(
1 + η(VM + ε) 0
0 1 + ηε
)
, (14)
and
σsymAB2 =
(
(ηVM
√
VM + 1)
1
2 0
0 −( ηVM√
VM+1
)
1
2
)
. (15)
Taking the loss rate 0.2dB/km and the modulation variance VM = 20,
we compare the performance of the UCVQKD protocol and the symmetrical
Gaussian modulation coherent-state protocol [15,17,28], as shown in Fig. 3
(See Appendix C for calculation of the asymptotic secret key rate). We find
that the UCVQKD protocol is obviously outperformed by the symmetrical
Gaussian modulation coherent-state protocol. Actually, this result is what we
expect, since the unidimensional modulation scheme uses only one quadra-
ture to carry the useful information, while its counterpart, the symmetrical
Gaussian modulation coherent-state protocol, uses both quadrature xˆ and pˆ
to carry information, which certainly results in a higher secret key rate. As a
result, one may have to make a tradeoff between the secret key rate and the
implementation for the given modulation variance.
Fortunately, a better performance of the UCVQKD protocol can be achieved
by dynamically choosing an optimal modulation variance VM . As shown in Fig.
4, we plot the asymptotic key rate of the UCVQKD protocol and the symmet-
rical coherent-state protocol with the optimized modulation variance VM at
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Fig. 3 Comparison of the UCVQKD protocol with symmetrically modulated Gaussian
coherent-state protocol. The blue line denotes the performance of corresponding sym-
metrically modulated Gaussian coherent-state protocol, while the red line represents the
UCVQKD protocol. The inset shows the maximum tolerable excess noise at each channel
loss. Modulation variance is VM = 20, reconciliation efficiency is β = 95%, and excess noise
is ε = 0.01.
each channel loss. The performance of the UCVQKD protocol is dramatically
improved by choosing the suitable modulation variance VM , whereas the best
performance of the symmetrical coherent-state protocol has been achieved.
Moreover, the gap of the performance between the UCVQKD protocol and
the symmetrical coherent-state protocol is shortened for the optimized VM .
Therefore, by choosing the optimal modulation variance VM , we can achieve
the relatively high performance, which approaches to the corresponding sym-
metrical coherent-state protocol, while paying only a little price.
4 Composable security analysis of the UCVQKD protocol
In the composable security analysis, we consider the detailed data processing
in the UCVQKD system so that one can obtain the tightest secure bound of
the protocol. In this section, we give the first composable security analysis
of the UCVQKD protocol against collective attacks. The definitions of the
composable security can be found in [24,32,33]. We, in what follows, elaborate
the composable security analysis of the UCVQKD protocol when confronting
collective attacks.
In this section, we focus on the EB UCVQKD protocol with RR, which can
be characterized by the similar parameters derived in the composable security
case as shown in Tab. 1. First of all, the two trusted parties, Alice and Bob,
obtain 2n-mode state respectively and form the global state denoted by ρ2nAB2 .
Then, homodyne detections are applied by Alice and Bob to measure their
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Fig. 4 The asymptotic security key rate of the UCVQKD protocol (red line) and the
corresponding symmetrically modulated Gaussian coherent-state protocol (blue line) as a
function of channel loss for every optimal modulation variance VM . The inset shows the
optimal VM for the current maximal secret key rate. Reconciliation efficiency is β = 95%,
and excess noise is ε = 0.01.
Table 1 The parameters of the UCVQKD protocol in the composable security analysis
parameter definition
2n number of light pulses (with single-quadraturemodulation)
exchanged in the UCVQKD.
λ percentage of the modulated quadratures detected correctly by Bob.
l size of the final key when the protocol did not abort.
d number of bits on which each measurement result is encoded.
leakEC size of Bob’s communication to Alice for error correction.
PE maximum failure probability of parameter estimation.
cor small probability of the failure that the keys of Alice and Bob
do not identical and the protocol did not abort.
nPE number of bits that Bob sends to Alice in parameter estimation.
Ωmaxa ,Ω
max
b , bounds on covariance matrix elements, which must be apt in
Ωminc the realization of the protocol.
respective obtained modes. It is known that homodyne detection on mode
A of two-mode squeezed vacuum state will project mode B onto a squeezed
state, which is subsequently transformed to a coherent state after passing a
squeezing operation. Note that it is not necessary to measure mode B2 using
heterodyne detection since only one quadrature has been modulated. Bob con-
tinues to apply homodyne measurements over mode B2 with the probability
λ, obliging Alice to discard the measurement results of unmodulated quadra-
ture. After that, Alice and Bob obtain two continuous variables X,Y ∈ R2λn.
Bob discretizes his 2λn-vector Y to obtain m-bit string U , where m = 2λdn,
i.e. each correct measurement result is encoded with d bits. During the error
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corrections, Bob sends syndrome of U which agreed on in advance to Alice
and lets Alice guess UA for the string of Bob. Bob computes a hash of U of
length dlog(1/cor)e and sends it to Alice who compares it with her own hash.
The protocol resumes if both hashes coincide. The value leakEC corresponds
to the total number of bits sent by Bob during this step. Subsequently, in
parameter estimation, Bob sends nPE bits of U to Alice, which is required for
calculations of ωa, ωb and ωc in Eqs. (17) (18) and (19). The protocol contin-
ues for ωa ≤ Ωmaxa and ωb ≤ Ωmaxb and ωc ≥ Ωminc . Finally, Alice and Bob
apply a random universal2 hash function to their respective strings, resulting
in the two final strings SA and SB of size l. In the following, we elaborate the
detailed composable security analysis of the UCVQKD protocol.
4.1 State preparation
Alice prepares 2n TMSV states |Ψ〉⊗2n of variance V and each state involves
two modes A and B, as expressed in Eq. (4). Without loss of generality, we
assume quadrature xˆ is the modulated quadrature. The transformed covariance
matrix can be derived in Eq. (6) after the state is transmitted through quantum
channel with transmittance ηx,p and excess noise εx,p. Once Alice and Bob
collect 2n pulses, the protocol will start to the next step.
4.2 Measurement
In the measurement, both Alice and Bob have access to 2n modes, where Alice
measures with heterodyne detector and Bob measures with homodyne detec-
tor, respectively. Because only one quadrature xˆ is modulated, Alice discards
the measurement results derived from quadrature pˆ meanwhile Bob measures
quadrature xˆ with probability λ. The reason is that Eve may know the pro-
tocol that Alice and Bob obeyed, and hence the two trusted parties must
measure the correct quadrature with a certain probability λ. Assume that the
two trusted parties are perfect so that Eve cannot know the executive proba-
bility. After that, Alice and Bob then form two vectors of length 2λn that can
be denoted by X = (X1, ..., X2λn) for Alice and Y = (Y1, ..., Y2λn) for Bob,
respectively. Notice that X and Y are continuous variables, and hence we have
to discretize them in order to let the data suitable for processing. Firstly, the
real axis can be divided into 2d intervals and this partition should be chosen
to maximize the secret key rate when the quantum channel acts as a Gaussian
channel with the fixed transmittance and excess noise. The average variance of
Bob’s measurement can be calculated as 12λn ||Y ||2. Thus, each interval (that
follows normal distribution N (0, 12λn ||Y ||2)) can be assigned a distinct value
by applying the discretization map D : Y 7→ U . The detailed discretization
discretization schemes can be found in the literature [34]. Finally, Alice obtains
X ∈ R2λn, whereas Bob obtains Y ∈ R2λn and U ∈ {1, ..., 2d}2λn.
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4.3 Error correction
Reverse reconciliation is applied for Alice to generate the string U . More specif-
ically, Bob sends the value of ||Y ||2, which is used for discretization function
D, to Alice. An effective technique for error correction is to perform sparse
parity-check code (LDPC) [35,36], which can be functionally defined by a
sparse parity-check matrix H of size (2λdn) × (2λdn − K), where K repre-
sents the length of check bits. Bob computes the syndrome HU of his vector
(after discretization) and sends the syndrome to Alice. This syndrome can be
deemed side information for most of the leakage in error correction. Thus, a
parameter β called reconciliation efficiency can be used to assess the quality
of error correction
β =
2λdn− leakEC
2λn log2(1 + SNR)
, (16)
where SNR = ηx,pVM/(2 + ηx,pεx,p) stands for signal-to-noise ratio, which
is that of the expected Gaussian channel mapping X and Y . The value of
reconciliation efficiency β quantifies the performance of error correction pro-
cedure and β = 1 denotes the perfect reconciliation efficiency. In practice, this
parameter can be achieved to about 0.95 for Gaussian channel [36].
After receiving the side information from Bob, Alice can recover the esti-
mated Uˆ of U by decoding the code in the coset corresponding to the syndrome
HU . For a part of the composable security analysis, it is necessary to know
whether error correction works, i.e. whether Uˆ = U or not. As mentioned
above, Bob chooses a hash function to map 2λdn-bit strings to strings of
length dlog(1/cor)e, and then he sends it to Alice who compares it with her
own hash. If both hashes are the identical, the protocol is cor-correct [32].
4.4 Parameter estimation
The goal of parameter estimation is to infer the transmitted quantum state
when one has access to a small number outcomes of parameters of the underly-
ing quantum state. It can be deemed a rough version of quantum tomography
[37], which allows us to estimate the covariance matrix of the whole UCVQKD
system.
As the protocol goes on, Bob sends nPE bits of U to Alice so that allows
her to calculate the estimated values ωa, ωb and ωc, where
ωa =
||X||2
2λn
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/PE)
n
]
− 1, (17)
ωb =
||Y ||2
2λn
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/PE)
n
]
− 1, (18)
ωc =
〈X,Y 〉
2λn
− 5(||X||2 + ||Y ||2)
√
log(8/PE)
n3
. (19)
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Thanks to the parameter estimation performed after error correction, therefore
knows the values of ||X||2, ||Y ||2 and 〈X,Y 〉 at the end of error correction.
Subsequently, she applies a PE test [24] to obtain a confidence region for the
covariance matrix of the states |TMSV 〉⊗2n. If the estimated values are all
obey the restraint of ωa ≤ Ωmaxa and ωb ≤ Ωmaxb and ωc ≥ Ωminc , the protocol
continues, otherwise aborts. The failure probability of parameter estimation is
denoted by PE .
However, for specific the UCVQKD protocol with xˆ quadrature modula-
tion, the corresponding coefficients of the covariance matrices of quadrature
xˆ and quadrature pˆ are not identical, and only quadrature xˆ carries the use-
ful information. Thus, in order to give the rigorous restraint of composable
security analysis for the UCVQKD protocol, one should choose the three apt
bounds as
Ωmaxa =
√
VM + 1 + δa, (20)
Ωmaxb = 1 + ηx(VM + εx) + δb, (21)
Ωminc = (ηxVM
√
VM + 1)
1
2 − δc, (22)
where δa, δb and δc are small positive constants which are optimized to ensure
maximum secret key rate.
4.5 Privacy amplification
According to the above-mentioned data processing, Alice and Bob now obtain
two strings Uˆ and U , respectively. In order to discard the information known
by Eve, Alice chooses an universal2 hash function [38,39] and extracts l bits
of secret key SA from Uˆ . Subsequently, Alice informs Bob which function she
has chosen and Bob uses it to compute SB [32].
In this step, the string U can be utilized for generating a key of size l which
is sec-secret provided that [40]
sec = min
′
1
2
√
2l −H′min(U |E′) + 2′ (23)
where E′ represents all the information that Eve learns from the UCVQKD.
Subsequently, we can calculate the secret key rate of the UCVQKD pro-
tocol (See Appendix D for the derivation of secret key rate when taking com-
posable security into account). In Fig. 5, we show the secret key rate of the
UCVQKD protocol against collective attacks in the frame of composable se-
curity. The brown line shows the maximum transmission distance (about 15
km) of the UCVQKD protocol, leading to the limitation of signal numbers
1012. As a comparison, we also plot the performance of symmetrically mod-
ulated Gaussian GG02 protocol [17] with the transmittance of the quantum
channel corresponds to distances of 15 km for losses of 0.2 dB/km. The sim-
ulation result, which shows that the UCVQKD protocol is outperformed by
GG02 protocol, is meet our expectation and the trend of previous asymptotic
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Fig. 5 Secret key rate of the UCVQKD protocol against collective attacks in the frame of
composable security, as a function the number of exchanged signals 2n. The black dashed
line denotes 15 km performance of the symmetrically modulated Gaussian GG02 protocol,
while the other lines, from top to bottom, represent 10 km (blue line), 12 km (red line), 13
km (green line) and 15 km (brown line) performances of the UCVQKD protocol, respectively.
The modulation variance is optimized, reconciliation efficiency is β = 95%, the excess noise
is εx = 0.01, and the discretization parameter is d = 5.
analysis. Although the performance of both protocols in the frame of com-
posable security seems worse than that of the asymptotic case, it is close to
the practical implementation. By applying composable security analysis of the
UCVQKD protocol, we can obtain the tightest bound of secret key rate of the
UCVQKD protocol.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the composable security of the UCVQKD protocol in the
asymptotic finite-size regime. We illustrate the relationship of the parameters
related to the unmodulated quadrature of the UCVQKD system and estimate
the precise secure region with two extreme scenarios. We propose the compos-
able security against collective attacks, and achieve the tightest bound of the
UCVQKD protocol. Numerical simulations show the balanced secret key rate
of the UCVQKD protocol. Although the key rate of the UCVQKD protocol is
slightly low in the case of the composable security analysis, it is can be simply
implemented in practice at the low cost.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Derivation of the covariance matrix
In what follows, we illustrate the derivation of Eq. (6) from Eq. (5). As the
states travel through quantum channel with transmittance ηx,p and excess
noise εx,p, we have
γA =
(
V 0
0 V
)
, (24)
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γB2 =
(
ηx(V
2 + χx) 0
0 ηp(1 + χp)
)
, (25)
σAB2 =
(√
ηxV (V 2 − 1) 0
0 −
√
ηp(V 2−1)
V
)
. (26)
Substituting VM = V
2 − 1 into Eqs. (24-26), we finally obtain the covariance
matrix in the presentation modulation variance VM , namely
ΓAB2 =

√
VM + 1 0 (ηxVM
√
VM + 1)
1
2 0
0
√
VM + 1 0 −( ηpVM√VM+1 )
1
2
(ηxVM
√
VM + 1)
1
2 0 1 + ηx(VM + εx) 0
0 −( ηpVM√
VM+1
)
1
2 0 1 + ηpεp
 .
Appendix B: Two extreme scenarios
We consider two extreme scenarios, i.e., the maximum excess noise εx = 1
(Fig. 6) and the maximum transmittance ηx = 1 (Fig.7).
Fig. 6 Regions bounded by physicality and positive secret key rate with the different values
of ηp and εp. Modulation variance is VM = 100, channel transmittance and excess noise in
quadrature xˆ, is ηx = 0.01 and εx = 1 respectively.
As shown in Fig. 6, we set the εx = 1 and a relatively small value of
ηx = 0.01, which is almost corresponding to the worst case in CVQKD sys-
tem. Although the unphysical region expands as parameter εx increases, even
occupies most of the colored regions (including secure region and unphysical
region in this case), the secure region still exists in the mazarine blue area,
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which means the UCVQKD protocol can still generate positive secret key rate
in the worst case scenario. In other word, even in the pessimistic scenario, there
still exist a ’secure window’ in the UCVQKD protocol that ensures secure com-
munication. On the other hand, Fig. 7 shows the simulation result conditioned
Fig. 7 Regions bounded by physicality and positive secret key rate with the different values
of ηp and εp. Modulation variance is VM = 100, channel transmittance and excess noise in
quadrature xˆ, is ηx = 1 and εx = 0.01 respectively.
by the parameters ηx = 1 and εx = 0.01. This case, essentially, denotes the
approximately best scenario in CVQKD system, because the transmittance
is maximum and excess noise is very small. Although the colored region (in-
cluding secure region and partly unphysical region in this case) is smaller, the
accessible maximum secret key rate can be acquired at point (1). Note that
the colored scale in this scenario is the largest comparing with other scenar-
ios (including the general scenario in main text), which means the highest
asymptotic secret key rate can be achieved in this scenario.
Appendix C: Calculation of the asymptotic secret key rate
We illustrate the calculation of asymptotic secret key rate of UCVQKD with
RR. After obtaining the expression of KRR in Eq. (3) and the transformed
covariance matrix ΓAB2 in Eq. (6), the covariance matrix of the state which is
conditioned by Bob’s homodyne detection in quadrature xˆ is given by
γA|xB = γA − σTAB2(XγB2X)MPσAB2 , (27)
with X = diag(1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0) and MP being the inverse operation on the
range; γA and γB2 are the submatrices of transformed covariance matrix ΓAB2
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representing each mode A and B individually; σAB2 is the correlation between
mode A and B in ΓAB2 .
One can derive the conditional matrix after Bob’s measurement with
γA|xB =
( √
VM+1(1+ηxεx)
1+ηx(VM+εx)
0
0
√
VM + 1
)
. (28)
Thus, Alice and Bob’s mutual information can be estimated by calculating the
following equation
I(A : B2) =
1
2
log
VA
VA|xB
, (29)
where VA, which is the variance of mode A, and VA|xB are easily calculated
from the first diagonal elements of the matrices γA and γA|xB respectively.
Finally we obtain
I(A : B2) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
ηxVM
1 + ηxx
)
. (30)
Due to the fact that Eve can provide a purification of Alice and Bobs density
matrix, we first achieve S(E) = S(AB2), which is a function of the symplectic
eigenvalues ν1,2 of ΓAB2 , given by
S(AB2) = G(
ν1 − 1
2
) +G(
ν2 − 1
2
), (31)
where
G(x) = (x+ 1) log(x+ 1)− x log x (32)
is the von Neumann entropy and the symplectic eigenvalues ν1,2 are calculated
by the square roots of the solutions of equation
ζ2 −∆ζ + detΓAB2 = 0, (33)
where∆ = det γA+det γB+2 detσAB2 . After Bob performs the projective mea-
surement xB , system AB2 is pure, and hence, we have S(E|xB) = S(A|xB),
then the conditional von Neumann entropy S(A|xB) = G[(ν3−1)/2] is a func-
tion of the symplectic eigenvalue ν3 of the covariance matrix γA|xB , which can
be calculated from ν3 =
√
det γA|xB .
Finally we are able to calculate the asymptotic secret key rate KRR of the
UCVQKD protocol.
Appendix D: Secret key rate of the composable security
We, here, detail the generation of secret key rate of UCVQKD provided by
the composable security analysis. Before illustrating the calculation, we give
a theorem of composable security for UCVQKD [24].
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The UCVQKD protocol is -secure against collective attacks if  = 2sm +
+ PE/+ cor/+ ent/ and if the final key length l is chosen such that
l ≤ 4λnHˆMLE(U)− 2λnF (Ωmaxa , Ωmaxb , Ωminc )
− leakEC −∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log 1
2
,
(34)
where HˆMLE(U) is the empiric entropy of U , the Maximum Likelihood Es-
timator (MLE) for H(U) to be HˆMLE(U) = −
∑2d
i=1 pˆi log pˆi with pˆi =
nˆi
2λdn
denotes the relative frequency of obtaining the value i and nˆi is the number
of times the variable U takes the value i for i ∈ {1, ..., 2d}, and
∆AEP =
√
2λn(d+ 1)2 +
√
32λn(d+ 1) log2
2
2sm
+
√
8λn log2
2
2sm
− 4smd

,
(35)
∆ent = log2
1

−
√
8λn log2(4λn) log(2/), (36)
and F is the function computing the Holevo information between Eve and
Bob. It is given by
F = G(
µ1 − 1
2
) +G(
µ2 − 1
2
)−G(µ3 − 1
2
), (37)
where µ1 and µ2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix ΓAB2 ,
the variables follow Eq. (20) (21) and (22). µ3 = Ω
max2
a −(Ωmin2c )2/(1+Ωmaxb ),
the entropy function G is identical with Eq. (B6). Moreover, the symplectic
eigenvalues µ1 and µ2 need to satisfy the following relations:
µ21 + µ
2
2 = Ω
max2
a +Ω
max2
b − 2Ωmin2c , (38)
µ21µ
2
1 = (Ω
max
a Ω
max
b −Ωmin2c )2. (39)
Now, let’s consider the calculation of secret key rate provided by UCVQKD
composable security analysis. Assuming that the calculation is based on a
Gaussian channel with transmissivity ηx,p and excess noise εx,p. The following
model is used for error correction
βS(Ax;Bx) = 2HˆMLE(U) − 1
2λn
leakEC , (40)
where β denotes the reconciliation efficiency, and S(Ax;Bx) represents the
mutual information between Alice and Bob. For the UCVQKD protocol in
Gaussian channel and the modulation variance VM on quadrature xˆ, we obtain
S(Ax;Bx) =
1
2
log2(1 + SNR)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ηxVM
2 + ηxεx
)
.
(41)
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Moreover, here, assuming that the probability of passing the parameter es-
timation step is at least 0.99, which means the robustness of the UCVQKD
protocol to be rob ≤ 10−2. This assumption can be achieved by taking values
for Ωmaxa , Ω
max
b , Ω
min
c differing by 3 standard deviations from the expected
values of ωa, ωb ,ωc [24]. By doing this, the values of random variables ||X||2,
||Y ||2 and 〈X,Y 〉 satisfy the following restraints
||X||2 ≤ δ(δ + 3)
√
VM + 1, (42)
||Y ||2 ≤ δ(δ + 3)[1 + ηx(VM + εx)], (43)
〈X,Y 〉 ≥ δ(δ − 3)(ηxVM
√
VM + 1)
1
2 , (44)
where δ =
√
2λn. Note that these restraints are obtained from the covariance
matrix ΓAB2 of the UCVQKD protocol with xˆ quadrature modulation and
the value of modulation variance VM must be optimized to obtain the optimal
performance. Finally, we use these bounds on Eqs. (42-44) and define:
Ωmaxa =
||X||2
2λn
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/PE)
n
]
− 1, (45)
Ωmaxb =
||Y ||2
2λn
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/PE)
n
]
− 1, (46)
Ωminc =
〈X,Y 〉
2λn
− 5(||X||2 + ||Y ||2)
√
log(8/PE)
n3
. (47)
With all the equations, we now can calculate the secret key rate of the UCVQKD
protocol provided by composable security
K xˆcomposable = (1− rob){βS(Ax;Bx)
− F (Ωmaxa , Ωmaxb , Ωminc )
− 1
2λn
(∆AEP +∆ent + 2 log2
1
2ε
)}.
(48)
In addition, we should optimize over all parameters compatible with  =
10−20. However, in order to simplify the description and give a fair comparison,
we make the following choices which slightly suboptimal the performance of the
UCVQKD protocol and identical with corresponding symmetrically modulated
Gaussian coherent-state protocol [24]
sm =  = 10
−21, PE = cor = ent = 10−41. (49)
